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Abstract-Virtual coordinate system (VCS) based rout- 
ing provides a practical, efficient and scalable means for 
point-to-point routing in wireless sensor networks. Several 
VCS-based routing protocols have been proposed in the 
last few years, all assuming that nodes are cooperative. 
However, malicious nodes may violate this assumption, 
making VCS-based routing protocols vulnerable to nu- 
merous attacks. Thus, it is critical to provide security 
mechanisms for these protocols to ensure correct operations 
in adversarial deployment environments. 
In this work, we study the security of VCS-based routing 
protocols. We identify new attacks targeting the accuracy 
and stability of virtual coordinates that VCS-based routing 
relies on and propose several defense mechanisms against 
the identified attacks. We evaluate the impact of the attacks 
and the effectiveness of our defense mechanisms using a 
well-known VCS-based routing protocol, BVR. 
Wireless sensor network designs have evolved in re- 
cent years, from primarily focusing on data collection [ l ]  
to more sophisticated tasks such as data centric storage 
[2], [3]. Likewise, the requirements for communication 
protocols have also evolved, from the basic many-to- 
one and one-to-many communications to more sophisti- 
cated point-to-point communications. Well-known wire- 
less routing protocols such as AODV [4] and DSR [5] 
are not appropriate solutions for sensor networks as they 
do not scale well for large networks and have relatively 
high overhead. Virtual coordinate system (VCS) based 
routing protocols have been proposed to overcome these 
limitations. In such protocols, routing is performed in 
a greedy manner based on virtual (or logical) coordi- 
nates obtained through a virtual coordinate establish- 
ment mechanism integrated with the routing protocol 
or through an external virtual coordinate system. VCS- 
based routing protocols require only local interactions 
and minimal state information that does not grow with 
the size of the network. As a result, such protocols have 
increased scalability and reduced overhead. 
In this paper, we study the problem of securing VCS- 
routing protocols. Like other routing protocols, VCS- 
based routing protocols are vulnerable to numerous at- 
tacks that seek to disturb the routing service by injecting, 
modifying, replaying or dropping packets. In addition, 
VCS-based routing protocols depend significantly on the 
accuracy and stability of the virtual coordinates. Our 
contributions are: 
. We identify and analyze new attacks against VCS- 
based routing protocols that target the virtual co- 
ordinates. We refer to the attacks as coordinate in- 
jation, dejation, oscillation, and pollution attacks. 
We show that virtual coordinate accuracy can be 
significantly influenced by coordinate injution, de- 
jation and pollution attacks while virtual coordinate 
stability can be influenced by coordinate oscillation 
attacks. 
. We evaluate experimentally the impact of the at- 
tacks on the accuracy and stability of virtual coordi- 
nates and on the routing performance, using a well- 
known VCS-based routing protocol, BVR [8]. Our 
experiments show that coordinate deflation is the 
most damaging attack, while coordinate inflation 
creates the least damage. 
. We propose defense mechanisms against virtual 
coordinate attacks. Specifically, we use hop-by- 
hop authentication and a novel wormhole detection 
technique to address coordinate deflation. We in- 
troduce a coordinate variance based parent selec- 
tion mechanism to mitigate coordinate oscillation 
attacks and a coordinate replication technique to 
mitigate coordinate pollution attacks. 
. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
defense and mitigation mechanisms through simula- 
tions using an implementation of the BVR protocol 
in the TOSSIM [lo] simulator. 
Although several VCS-based routing protocols have The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec- 
been proposed in the last few years [6], [7], [8], [9], there tion I1 provides an overview of the main mechanisms 
has been little work that investigates the security of such involved in the design of VCS-based routing protocols. 
protocols. As many applications for wireless sensor net- Section I11 presents attacks against the virtual coordi- 
works require deployment in adversarial environments, it nates. Section IV outlines several defense mechanisms. 
is critical to provide security mechanisms to make these Section V demonstrates the impact of the attacks and the 
protocols operate correctly in the presence of attackers. effectiveness of our defense mechanisms using the BVR 
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routing protocol. Section VI overviews related work and 
Section VII concludes our paper. 
In this section, we provide an overview of the common 
design of VCS-based routing protocols. 
VCS-based routing protocols are geographical routing 
protocols that forward packets to the neighbor that is 
closest to the destination. Instead of using physical 
coordinates, VCS-based routing protocols use virtual 
or logical coordinates obtained through an integrated 
virtual coordinate establishment mechanism or a virtual 
coordinate system external to the routing protocol. In 
the following, we assume the virtual coordinate system 
is integrated with the routing protocol. 
Most VCS-based routing protocol designs share four 
major components: (1) virtual coordinate establishment, 
(2) destination node coordinate lookup, (3) greedy rout- 
ing, and (4) a fall-back or complementary procedure. 
Virtual coordinate establishment is achieved based on a 
set of reference nodes that can be special infrastructure 
nodes, such as landmarks [6], or regular sensor nodes [7], 
[S]. The virtual coordinates are established based on the 
connectivity graph of the network. A common approach 
is for the reference nodes to periodically broadcast 
coordinate messages in the network. The flooding of 
these messages across the network builds the shortest 
path trees rooted at each of the reference nodes among 
all the nodes in the network. For convenience, the parent 
of a node on the shortest path tree is referred to as the 
parent of the node. The hop count from a reference node 
accumulates on the packet as the packet is flooded across 
the network. The network coordinates of a node are then 
derived based on the hop counts to each of the reference 
nodes. 
In order to route a message to a destination the 
source node must be able to lookup the coordinates 
of the destination node. Many protocols use a set of 
coordinate servers to maintain coordinates for the nodes 
in the network. Nodes are mapped to a coordinate server 
by using a hash function. A node is responsible for 
informing the coordinate server storing its coordinates 
of any change. In general, the number of changes is low 
in static wireless sensor networks. 
Once a node obtains the coordinates of the destination 
node, VCS-based routing follows the geographic routing 
paradigm, in which each node forwards the message to 
the neighbor that is the closest to the destination under 
some protocol specific distance metric. 
Finally, if the greedy routing reaches a node that is 
closer to the destination than all of its neighbors (i.e. 
a local minima), a protocol specific fall-back procedure 
is invoked. For example, in the case of the protocol in 
[S], the fall-back procedure re-directs the message to 
the reference node (known as a beacon) closest to the 
destination. When the message reaches that beacon node, 
it is then flooded in the network. Typically, the fall-back 
procedure incurs much more overhead than the greedy 
forwarding process. 
Two properties of the virtual coordinate establishment 
that influence the performance of VCS-based routing 
protocols are accuracy and stability. Accuracy captures 
the difference between the perceived coordinates of 
the nodes and their actual coordinates, while stability 
captures the frequency of coordinate changes. Inaccurate 
coordinates may cause messages to be routed in a wrong 
direction; unstable coordinates, on the other hand, can 
cause route flapping and incur additional coordinate 
maintenance overhead. 
In this section we present several new attacks against 
VCS-based routing protocols. The attacks are specific 
to VCS-based routing protocols and exploit the fact 
that such protocols depend heavily on the accuracy 
and stability of the virtual coordinates. After describing 
the assumptions we make about adversaries, we outline 
some general attacks against wireless sensor networks. 
We then describe attacks against the virtual coordinate 
establishment and the coordinate lookup component of 
VCS-based routing protocols. Finally, we exemplify how 
the newly identified virtual coordinate attacks can be 
exploited to attack the greedy-routing protocol. 
A. Adversarial Model 
We assume that the radio links are insecure. The 
attackers can eavesdrop on the radio transmissions, inject 
packets, modify packets, and replay previously overheard 
packets. We assume "mote" class attackers [ l  11, that 
is, the attacker nodes are similar in capabilities as 
legitimate nodes. We also do not assume the legitimate 
sensor nodes are tamper resistant. The attacker may 
compromise some legitimate nodes and get full control 
on the operations of the compromised nodes. She can 
also extract all the secret keys and any other data in the 
compromised nodes to share with other attacker nodes. 
The attacker may also arrange multiple attacker nodes 
to collude via high quality communication links and 
establish wormholes. 
The physical and MAC layers are susceptible to direct 
attacks. The attacker can jam the network with high 
power radio transmitters. She can also more stealthily 
mount DoS attacks on the MAC by exploiting the spe- 
cific vulnerabilities of the MAC protocol. The physical 
layer DoS attacks are typically countered by frequency 
hopping or spread spectrum techniques. The MAC layer 
attacks can be addressed with more secure MAC pro- 
tocols, such as [12]. While these attacks are real and 
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dangerous, we consider them out of the scope of the 
paper. 
We do not focus on general attacks against sensor 
networks, such as Sybil attacks [ 131, or node replication 
attacks [14], in which a single adversary can control a 
significant fraction of the network by claiming multiple 
identities or cloning a subset of physical devices, re- 
spectively. We assume that techniques such as [IS] are 
employed to address Sybil attacks and [14] to address 
node replication attacks. 
B. General Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks 
Several basic attacks against sensor networks were 
outlined in [ l l ] .  Some of these attacks can be used in 
the virtual coordinate attacks we identify. To facilitate 
the presentation of the virtual coordinate attacks, we 
summarize them here: 
Spoojing, altering, or  replaying packets: The attacker 
exploits the open nature of wireless communication and 
the lack of authentication to spoof, alter, or replay control 
or data packets. Such attacks can usually be prevented 
using authentication protocols and freshness mechanisms 
such as timestamps, nonces, and sequence numbers. 
Selective forwarding: The attacker does not correctly 
provide the routing service by selectively dropping some 
of the packets. This type of attack requires the attacker 
to be an insider and cannot be addressed by means of 
authentication. 
Wormhole: One attacker node forwards the overheard 
messages via some out-of-band channel to another at- 
tacker node in a distant network region where the 
messages are replayed. The wormhole attack gener- 
ally causes confusion on the neighborhood relationship 
among legitimate nodes, which usually damages normal 
operations of the upper layer protocols. Previously pro- 
posed solutions to address this problem require tight 
clock synchronization and topology information [17] 
not necessarily available in sensor networks, specialized 
hardware such as directional antennas [18], or are de- 
signed for specific MAC protocols [19] not appropriate 
for sensor networks. 
C. Virtual Coordinate Attacks 
VCS-based routing protocols rely significantly on the 
accuracy and stability of the virtual coordinates. A 
class of attacks specific to VCS-based routing protocols 
target the virtual coordinate establishment and coordinate 
lookup components, causing the resulting coordinates 
to be unusable to the routing protocol. Specifically, the 
attacker aims to cause legitimate nodes to have incorrect 
coordinates, unstable coordinates, or both. Now we clas- 
sify the attacks against virtual coordinates based on their 
intended effect on the coordinate system established. 
1 )  Coordinate Deflation Attack: The goal of this 
attack is to cause legitimate nodes to obtain network 
coordinates smaller than their actual coordinates. One 
way an attacker can mount this attack is by announcing 
incorrect small coordinates in its neighborhood. The 
attacker nodes can be either compromised legitimate 
nodes or outside malicious nodes spoofing legitimate 
nodes. Another way the attacker can mount this attack 
is by using the wormhole attack. If one attacker node is 
located close to a reference node, it can tunnel the over- 
heard legitimate announcements with small coordinates 
to another attacker node in a distant network region. By 
replaying these tunneled coordinate announcements, the 
attacker can cause legitimate nodes in the distant region 
to derive incorrect small coordinates. 
2 )  Coordinate Inflation Attack: The goal of this attack 
is to cause legitimate nodes to obtain larger coordinates 
than their actual coordinates. Similar to the coordinate 
deflation attack, the attacker can announce artificially 
enlarged coordinates by either compromising legitimate 
nodes, spoofing legitimate nodes, or tunnelling and re- 
playing legitimate announcements of large coordinates 
from a distant network region. 
Unlike the coordinate deflation attack, the coordinate 
inflation attack is not always effective. If the legitimate 
nodes have a path to the reference node that does not pass 
through any attacker nodes, the legitimate nodes can still 
derive correct network coordinates from the coordinate 
message forwarded on the correct path. However, if the 
attacker nodes form a vertex-cut between the legitimate 
nodes and the reference nodes, the incorrect large coor- 
dinate announcements from the attacker nodes directly 
inflate the coordinates of these legitimate nodes. If the 
protocol considers path quality when determining coor- 
dinates, the coordinate inflation attack can also be made 
more effective by having the attacker nodes announce 
large coordinates but with good path quality. 
3) Coordinate Oscillation Attack: The goal of this 
attack is to cause instability of the virtual coordinates. 
The attacker can mount this attack by alternatively 
making announcements with small coordinates and large 
coordinates or by making random coordinate announce- 
ments. As a result, the legitimate nodes near the attacker 
node adjust their coordinates accordingly and oscillate 
between large and small coordinates. Similar to the 
coordinate inflation and deflation attacks, the fake co- 
ordinate announcements made by the attacker nodes can 
either be from compromised nodes, spoofing nodes, or 
be wormhole tunneled from other regions of the network. 
4 )  Coordinate Pollution Attack: The operation of the 
VCS-based routing relies on the correct information of 
the destination coordinates. Unlike coordinate inflation, 
deflation, or oscillation attacks which cause nodes to 
































coordinate pollution attack is to influence the coordinate 
lookup so that source nodes obtain incorrect coordinates 
of the destination nodes they need to route to. 
We discuss two approaches that the attacker can use 
to mount this attack. As described in Section 11, virtual 
coordinate systems use coordinate servers to store the 
virtual coordinates of all the nodes in the network and 
to respond to coordinate queries from possible source 
nodes looking up coordinates of destination nodes. If the 
attacker can compromise one or more coordinate servers, 
she can give arbitrary responses to the coordinate queries 
directed to adversarial controlled servers. 
Alternatively, the attacker can mount the attack in a 
way similar to the rushing attack [20]. If the attacker can 
spoof the coordinate servers, she can directly forge re- 
sponses to position queries and send the forged response 
to the victim node before the response from the actual 
coordinate server arrives. If the victim node uses only 
the first query response and ignores others, it will use 
the wrong destination coordinate information for all the 
messages destined to the target node. 
The danger of the coordinate pollution attack lies in 
the fact that the affected messages are usually forwarded 
futilely over many hops toward wrong or non-existent 
positions in the network. Eventually, the messages are 
either dropped when the TTL expires or the expensive 
fall-back mode is invoked on the message if the message 
reaches a local minimal before the TTL expires. There- 
fore, incorrect destination coordinates not only cause a 
significant number of routing failures, but also incur 
a significant amount of resource consumption in the 
network. 
D. Impact of Virtual Coordinate Attacks 
An attacker can disrupt normal message routing in 
the network by directly disrupting the virtual coordinate 
establishment and the node coordinate lookup process. 
In addition, since the success of the greedy routing is 
the key to the low overhead of a typical VCS-based 
routing protocol, the attacker can also indirectly impede 
the correct functioning of the network by causing a 
large number of greedy routing failures. The frequent 
invocation of the expensive fall-back mode in the routing 
protocol causes an overwhelmingly high overhead in the 
network and degrades the routing performance. 
The vulnerabilities on the virtual coordinates may 
also be exploited to magnify the attacker's power in 
attacking some specific VCS-based routing protocol. For 
example, in BVR, nodes prefer neighbors with small 
coordinates as next hop for message forwarding. By 
using the coordinate deflation attack, the attacker node 
artificially deflates the network coordinates in the region 
thus attracting a significant portion of the routing traffic 
in the network. Once the traffic is diverted through 
the attacker node, it can either behave as a gray-hole 
by selectively dropping routing traffic to mount more 
targeted attacks or behave as a black-hole by dropping 
all routing traffic. 
We note that in the context of wireless sensor net- 
works, as nodes rely on other nodes to derive their 
virtual coordinates, all of the virtual coordinate attacks 
are "contagious," in the sense that legitimate nodes once 
affected by the attack become "attackers" themselves, 
and propagate the effect of the attack further in the 
network. For example, for the coordinate deflation attack, 
once the direct neighbors of the attacker node derive in- 
correct small coordinates for themselves, they announce 
these incorrect coordinates in their neighborhoods and 
cause their neighbors to have incorrect small coordinates 
as well. This infection process continues throughout the 
whole network until the incorrect coordinate announce- 
ments reach the legitimate nodes that are closer to the 
actual reference node than to the attacker node. A back- 
of-envelope calculation reveals that a well positioned 
attacker can result in as much as 80% of the nodes in 
the network to have wrong coordinates. Similarly, the 
effect of a coordinate inflation attack and a coordinate 
oscillation attack can be propagated throughout a large 
portion of the network with a single well positioned 
attacker node. Due to the potential network wide impact 
that can be achieved by a small number of attackers, 
these attacks are particularly dangerous. 
IV. MITIGATING VIRTUAL COORDINATE ATTACKS 
In this section, we describe the mechanisms to mit- 
igate the virtual coordinate attacks described in the 
previous section. We first describe our assumptions, then 
we focus on the defense against the attacks. Our goal 
is to maintain accurate and stable virtual coordinates 
and high routing performance with minimum overhead 
despite the presence of attackers. To avoid blacklist 
attacks where a node spreads false rumors about other 
nodes, we adopt the principle that a node makes decision 
only based on their own observations. 
A. Assumptions 
We assume broadcast authentication is available, 
which can be achieved by using existing techniques 
such as pTESLA [21]. We also assume the existence of 
symmetric keys between any two nodes in the network, 
which can be achieved by using a pre-distributed key 
management scheme for sensor networks such as [22], 
[23], [24], [25], [26]. This enables data source authenti- 
cation, excluding the possibility of outsider attacks, such 
as message spoofing, altering, and injection. 
We assume the existence of a secure neighbor ver- 
ification method that allows each node to verify di- 
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method is not invoked unless the presence of attacks is 
positively detected, simple and inexpensive mechanisms 
are sufficient. For example, one may implement such 
a verification method by measuring and comparing the 
RTT to the claimed neighbor with the estimated one-hop 
RTT. Finally, we assume that the network is static and 
relatively stable, and that there is a period of time, such 
as the initial period after the network deployment, when 
the network is not under attack. 
B. Mitigating Inflation and Deflation Attacks 
An attacker mounts the inflation and deflation at- 
tacks by making malicious coordinate announcements or 
by tunneling overheard legitimate coordinate announce- 
ments from one network region to another network re- 
gion. Data source authentication prevents attacker nodes 
from spoofing or injecting packets. However, the correct 
derivation of the coordinates of each node relies on other 
nodes in the network correctly updating the coordinate 
messages as they are flooded across the network. Thus, 
further mechanisms are necessary to prevent attacker 
nodes from making malicious changes to the coordinate 
messages. In the following, we first describe a hash chain 
based technique that prevents attacks in the absence of 
wormholes, then we address the wormhole based attacks. 
Our techniques can be adapted to work for both 
inflation and deflation attacks. However, deploying the 
protection mechanisms for both attacks will double the 
overhead of the protocol. As noted in the previous 
section and validated in the experiments (Section V-B), 
the coordinate inflation attack has only limited impact in 
general network topologies. Thus, we only focus on the 
coordinate deflation attack. 
I) Preventing Deflation Attacks Based on Malicious 
Coordinate Message Updates: Most VCS-based routing 
protocols use a hop count andlor some hop count like 
field (e.g. path quality) in the coordinate messages for 
deriving network coordinates. In the following, we dis- 
cuss a hash chain based technique similar to the one in 
[27] for protecting the hop count field in detail. We note 
that this method can be easily adapted to protect other 
hop count like fields that are incremented at each hop. 
To use the hash chain to protect the hop count field, 
the reference node first generates a random number r  
and uses a one-way hash function H  to generate a hash 
chain, 
T ,  H ( r ) ,  H ( ~ )  ( r ) ,  . . . , ~ ( ~ ) ( r ) ,  
where ~ ( ~ ) ( r )  denotes applying H  on r  iteratively for 
i  times, and N  is the estimated upper bound for the 
network diameter. The reference node then uses authen- 
ticated broadcast to disseminate the tuple ( ~ ( ~ ) ( r ) ,  N ) ,  
referred to as the anchor tuple, throughout the network. 
When broadcasting coordinate messages, instead of in- 
cluding the plain hop count, the reference node includes 
the tuple (0, T ) ,  referred to as the hop count tuple, in the 
message. 
When a node receives the hop count tuple ( i ,  vi)  in the 
coordinate message, it first verifies that H ( * - ~ ) ( V ~ )  = 
H ( N )  ( r ) .  If the verification is successful, the node 
determines its hop count as i  + 1 and forwards the tuple 
( i  + 1, H(vi ) )  to their neighbors. 
Note that with the above approach, it is impossible for 
a node to claim a hop count that is smaller than its actual 
hop count by more than one, unless they are able to invert 
the hash function H .  The attacker node, however, can 
claim one less hop count by replaying the hop count 
tuple it received from the previous hop. Such attacks 
only result in a decrease of one in the coordinates of the 
attacker node, and we expect them to have only limited 
impact in affecting the coordinates of other nodes. 
2) Detection of Deflation Attacks Based on Worm- 
holes: Besides making malicious updates to the co- 
ordinate messages directly, wormholes present another 
viable means for mounting the deflation attacks. We 
now present a technique for detecting and eliminating 
wormhole based deflation attacks. 
Our wormhole detection algorithm relies on the ob- 
servation that in the presence of the coordinate deflation 
attack the hop count distribution of the nodes differs 
significantly from the distribution in the case without 
attacks. More specifically, the coordinate deflation attack 
causes more nodes to have small hop counts and fewer 
nodes to have large hop counts. In a naive approach, 
we can detect such changes, hence the presence of the 
attack, by querying the coordinates of all the nodes in the 
network. In the following, we propose a more efficient 
algorithm based on statistical sampling for detecting such 
changes. 
Our algorithm runs on a central entity (CE), which 
can be a base station or a laptop that sweeps through 
the network periodically. In the high level, the CE first 
estimates the hop count distribution, referred to as the 
reference distribution, for the case when the network is 
known to be not under attack (e.g. immediately after the 
network deployment). Then the CE periodically com- 
pares the estimate of the current hop count distribution 
with the estimated reference distribution using Pearson's 
X2-test [28] to determine if a change in the distribution 
has occurred. Now we describe the details of the method. 
Characterizing the hop count distribution To ef- 
ficiently estimate the hop count distribution, the CE 
performs simple random sampling (SRS) on the network 
by uniformly randomly selecting m nodes with replace- 
ment. Then the CE queries the sampled nodes for their 
coordinates and records (nl , np), where nl is the number 
of nodes with hop count less than or equal to a hop count 
threshold k and np is the number of nodes with hop 

































input to the algorithm. Optimally, k is selected such that 
in the presence of the attack, there are more nodes for all 
the hop counts less than or equal k and fewer nodes for 
all the hop counts greater than k. The optimal value for 
k maximizes the changes in nl  and n2 before and after 
the attack, thus maximizing the probability of detecting 
the changes. Typically, half of the network diameter is a 
good estimation for k. Note that since we sample with 
replacement, the unique number of nodes in the sample 
is most likely smaller than the sample size.' 
Statistical change detection Let ( r l  , r 2 )  and (s l  , s 2 )  
be the numbers that the CE recorded in the time assumed 
with no attacks and in some other time for which we 
wish to check for the presence of attacks. We now 
perform the Pearson's X2-test as follows. 
Let El = i ( r l  + s l ) ,  E2 = i ( r2  2 + s2) ,  and 
then assuming the network is not under attack, we have 
X 2  follows the X 2  distribution with 1 degree of freedom, 
and the P-value p = Pr(X2 > X 2 )  can be obtained with 
the standard statistical software. Let f (e.g. 0.05) be the 
acceptable false positive rate, we declare that the network 
is under attack if p < f .  
Note that the above method assumes the hop count 
distribution in the network is static. To account for 
normal network varations, we can adjust ( T I ,  7-2) by 
a small amount 6 and perform the above test only if 
sl > rl + 6 .  The value of 6 depends on the expected 
network variations and is empirically estimated. 
Once a wormhole deflation attack is detected, the CE 
floods the network with a wormhole warning message. 
Upon receiving the warning message, each node per- 
forms neighbor verification on their parent node. If the 
verification fails, it regards the node as an attacker and 
re-calculates its coordinates based on its other neighbors. 
C. Mitigating Coordinate Oscillation Attack 
In the coordinate oscillation attack, honest nodes up- 
date their coordinates frequently due to the rapid changes 
in the coordinate announcements made by their parent 
node, which can be an attacker node or some other 
honest node affected by the attack. To mitigate this 
attack, we propose a stability based parent selection 
policy, under which more stable neighbors are preferred 
as the parent. We now present the details as follows. 
To determine the stability of its neighbors, each node 
stores the last t coordinate announcements from each of 
its neighbors. The node then calculates the coordinate 
variance for each of the neighbors as follows. Let 
 he expected value for the unique number of nodes in a sample of 
size m from a total of n nodes is n(l - ( 1  - l /n )m)  
(c l ,  c2, . . . , ct) be one of the coordinate components of 
the last t coordinate announcements from neighbor n, 
then the coordinate variance for the neighbor n  with 
respect to the coordinate component is 
where pn = $ x i = ,  ci. A node rejects a neighbor as 
its parent if its coordinate variance for any coordinate 
component is larger than a threshold. The value for the 
threshold is empirically estimated by considering normal 
network variations. 
Although initially the attacker node can cause close 
honest nodes to vary their coordinates rapidly and also 
appear as attacker nodes to other nodes, after t coordinate 
announcements are collected from the attacker node, all 
of its honest neighbors will reject to use the ,attacker 
node as their parent due to the large variance computed 
for the attacker node. Thus, the attacker node is quickly 
isolated by its neighbors and the network re-stablizes. 
As a side benefit, this stability based parent selection 
policy may also result in more stable coordinate system 
for networks not under attack. 
We note that a smarter attacker node may overcome 
this defense mechanism by varying its coordinate an- 
nouncements in a smaller range or less frequently so that 
its computed variance is below the threshold. However, 
the impact of such an attack is significantly smaller than 
the full scale oscillation attacks. 
D. Mitigating Coordinate Pollution Attack 
In a coordinate pollution attack, source nodes obtain 
incorrect virtual coordinates for destination nodes. Since 
the authentication mechanisms described in Section IV- 
A prevent spoofed replies to coordinate queries, the 
main threat for coordinate pollution attacks comes from 
compromised coordinate servers. We propose to mitigate 
such threats by using redundant coordinate servers. More 
specifically, each node stores its coordinates in multiple 
coordinate servers, instead of in only one coordinate 
server. When querying the coordinates for a target node, 
the node sends the query to a random coordinate server 
from all of the coordinate servers for the target node. 
If the coordinates obtained from the selected coordinate 
server result in poor routing performance, the node 
queries all of the coordinate servers for the target node. 
Then through a majority voting scheme, the node de- 
termines which coordinate servers are malicious and 
refrains from using those servers for future queries. 
We note that if the attacker compromised a majority 
of the coordinate servers maintaining the coordinates for 
some node, then there is no solution [29] to guaranteeing 
that coordinate lookups for that node will return correct 
results. 
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In this section, we evaluate the impact of the at- 
tacks and the effectiveness of our proposed defense and 
mitigation mechanisms using an implementation of the 
well-known VCS-based routing protocol, BVR [8] in 
the TOSSIM [lo] simulator for sensor networks. We 
selected BVR because it is a mature protocol which was 
shown to perform well in non-adversarial environments. 
In BVR, the reference nodes and coordinate messages 
used to compute coordinates are referred to as beacons 
and beacon messages, respectively. The beacons also 
serve as coordinate servers. The coordinates in BVR 
are described as a vector of hop-counts to each beacon. 
Below we will use this terminology to describe the 
experiments and discuss the results. 
A. Experiment Setup and Metrics 
The network consists of 100 nodes uniformly ran- 
domly distributed. The radio links are generated with 
the Los syBui lder tool included in TOSSIM, which 
generates probabilistic links based on empirical mea- 
surements from real motes. The average node degree is 
12. We randomly select 8 nodes to be beacons, each 
of which floods a beacon message every 10 seconds. 
For evaluating the routing performance, we make a 
routing request between two randomly selected nodes 
every second. For evaluating the impact of the attacks, 
the attackers are randomly selected among the nodes and 
all attackers drop all data packets passing through them. 
The duration of each experiment is 2000 seconds. The 
experiment results are the average of 10 different runs 
with different random topologies. 
We seek to evaluate the accuracy and stability of the 
virtual coordinates and their effect on the routing service. 
We use n to denote the total number of nodes, m to 
denote the number of beacons, i.e. the dimensions of 
the coordinates. The correct coordinates of node i are 
denoted as c', = (cil, cia,. . . , cim), while the perceived 
coordinates (due to attacks) of node i are denoted as 
6 = (x i l ,  xi2,. . . , xim). 
Virtual coordinate accuracy: We characterize virtual 
coordinate accuracy by using the absolute errors in the 
coordinates for individual nodes and for the system as 
a whole. We define the error of the jth component of 
node i's coordinates, eij, as eij = lxij - cij 1, and the 
error of the coordinates of node i as ei = xGl eij. We 
use mean absolute error (MAE) to characterize system- 
wide errors. The system-wide error of the jth coordinate 
component E j  is defined as Ej = xy=l eij, and the 
system-wide error E is defined as E = xcl Ej .  
Virtual coordinate stability: We characterize virtual 
coordinate stability by using the variance of the coordi- 
nates for individual nodes and for the system as a whole. 
We sample the coordinates of all nodes in the network 
periodically. Let T be the total number of samples taken 
and ct = (x:, , x:,, . . . , xi,) be the coordinates of 
node i at the tth sample. We define the instability value 
of the jth component of node i's coordinates sij as 
s . .  2J - L E T  T - l  t=l ( x : ~  - x ; ~ ) ~ ,  where x;j = $ xi 
The instability value for the coordinates of node i is 
defined as si = x;, sij. The system-wide instability 
value for the jth coordinate component S j  is defined as 
S j  = xy=l sij and the system-wide instability value 
S is defined as S = xEn=, S j .  
Routing performance: We characterize routing per- 
formance by using the routing success ratio which is 
defined as the ratio between the number of successful 
route requests and the number of route requests issued. 
Since the performance of VCS-based routing protocols 
relies on the success of greedy forwarding for the major- 
ity route requests, we consider only the greedy routing 
success in the route success ratio. We also examine the 
cost of the protocol by measuring the total network traffic 
required to route a packet. 
B. Coordinate Injlation and Dejlation Attacks 
In these experiments, we consider that inflation and 
deflation attacks are performed by the attacker nodes 
en-route, by increasing or decreasing the hop-counts 
carried in the beacon packets. The beacons are assumed 
to behave correctly. For the coordinate deflation attack, 
we experiment with the case where the falsely claimed 
hop count is 0 and 1, referred to as Deflation(0) and 
Deflation(1). For the inflation attack we experiment with 
the case where the falsely claimed hop count is 20 
referred to as Inflation(20). Deflation(0) and Inflation(20) 
correspond to the strongest deflation and inflation at- 
tacks. We consider two scenarios: 
Single beacon: This scenario investigates the impact 
of the attacks for one coordinate component. The co- 
ordinates modified are issued by one beacon. We vary 
the number of adversaries from I to 5, but we include 
only the results for the case of 5 adversaries due to their 
similar trend. 
Full-scale: This scenario investigates the impact of the 
attacks for all coordinate components. The coordinates 
modified are issued by all the beacons, the number of 
attackers varies from 1 to 20. 
Fig l(a) shows the CDF of the error of the affected co- 
ordinate component (eil) in the single beacon scenario. 
As it can be seen in the strongest attack, Deflation(O), 
about 70% of the nodes have an error greater than 1 hop 
and about 50% of the nodes have an error greater than 
2 hops. Fig I(b) and l(c) show the system coordinate 
error E and the routing success ratio, respectively, in the 
full-scale scenario. The figures show that Deflation(0) 
has the most severe impact on both the accuracy of the 
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2 attacker nodes can bring the route success ratio from 
around 90% to only 40%. In contrast, the coordinate 
inflation attack has virtually no impact on either of these 
metrics. In addition, the full-scale scenario shows that 
the impact of the attack increases more slowly when 
the number of attackers goes beyond 5. This is because 
the network is almost fully disturbed with 5 attackers. 
Increasing the number of attackers further causes only 
limited additional damages. 
The authentication techniques presented in Section IV- 
B.l prevent the inflation and deflation attacks in the ab- 
sence of wormholes. In the next section, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of our algorithm as described in Section IV- 
B.2 for detecting wormhole based attacks. 
C. Wormhole-based Coordinate Deflation Detection 
We focus on the detection of wormholes used in defla- 
tion attacks, because deflation attacks are the most severe 
attacks and authentication cannot prevent a wormhole- 
based coordinate deflation. As in the previous section, we 
consider the case when the falsely advertised coordinates 
are 0 and 1, and refer to the attacks as Deflation(0) and 
Deflation(1). 
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our detection 
mechanisms in two scenarios. The first scenario uses 
the TOSSIM environment with a setup of 500 nodes 
and the average node degree of 20. The second scenario 
investigates the scalability of our scheme, in a simulator 
for ideal unit disk networks with 3000 nodes randomly 
distributed in a square area and the average node degree 
of 12. As our wormhole based deflation attack relies on 
statistical sampling, the increased network size allows 
us to show the effect of different sample sizes. In both 
cases we assign five randomly selected nodes as worm- 
hole attackers which replay coordinate announcements 
wormhole tunneled from another attacker node located 
at one hop (in Deflation(0)) and two hop (in Deflation(1)) 
distance from a beacon node. We measure the detection 
rate and the false positive rate by averaging 50 different 
random network topologies. 
Fig 2(a) shows both the detection rate and the false 
positive rate of the detection algorithm in the TOSSIM 
environment. Fig 2(b) shows the number of unique 
nodes queried for different sample sizes. As it can be 
seen from these figures, with a sample size of 300 
(about 226 unique nodes in the sample), our detection 
algorithm achieves almost 100% detection rate. The 
theoretical false positive rate for the algorithm is 0.05, 
the selected detection cutoff P-value. However, we see a 
slight increase in the false positive rate as the sample size 
increases. This is because with larger sample sizes the 
detection algorithm becomes more sensitive to normal 
variations in the network. This anomaly can be countered 
by taking into account the normal network variation in 
the detection algorithm. 
Fig 2(c) shows the result for the 3000 nodes case in 
the ideal simulator. The figure shows that the detection 
rate is almost 1 for even a sample size of 100 and the 
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D. Coordinate Oscillation Attack and Defense selected to be the source node, and issues route requests 
We demonstrate the impact of the coordinate oscilla- to other randomly selected nodes, once per second, after 
tion attack and the effectiveness of our proposed defense the initial 600 second warm-up period. 
with the single beacon and the full-scale scenarios as Fig 4(a) and 4(b) show the route success ratio and the 
described in Section V-B. We consider two types of total network traffic over time averaged in 100 second 
oscillation attacks, the alternate oscillation attack where window for the coordinate pollution attack with and 
the attackers alternatively make the coordinate announce- without the defense mechanism. As seen in these figures, 
ment of 0 and 20 and the random oscillation attack the coordinate pollution attack not only decreases the 
where the attackers make coordinate announcements route success ratio, but also increases the total band- 
uniformly randomly between 0 and 20. We refer to width consumption significantly. It takes only about 100 
these two attacks as Alternate and Random, respectively. seconds for our defense mechanism to isolate malicious 
The interval between two announcements is uniformly beacon nodes and to return both metrics to a level similar 
randomly between 0 and 20 seconds. We record the to the no attack case. The slight discrepancy in the route 
coordinates of all the nodes every 100 seconds, after the success ratio between the no attack case and the attack 
initial 600 seconds warm-up to discount the instability with our defense mechanism case is due to the smaller 
due to system initialization. number of honest beacons, which have a more important 
Fig 3(a) shows the impact of the Alternate and Ran- role in packet routing than regular nodes in BVR. 
dom attacks on the stability of the affected coordinate VI. RELATED WORK 
with and Our defense mechanism in Recent work on the security of sensor networks mainly 
the sing1e Fig 3(b) and 3(c) show the focused on key management schemes that can 
impact of the and Random attacks On the be used to bootstrap other services [22], [23], [24], [25], 
coordinate system and on the routing success ratio with [26], addressing general attacks such as Sybil [151 and 
and without our defense mechanism. As seen in these replication [141 attacks, and identifying basic attacks in 
figures, both the alternate and random oscillation attacks wireless sensor networks 
can cause significant instability to the node coordinates The problem of security in VCS-based routing proto- 
and degrade the routing success and cols has not been studied to the best of our knowledge. 
the Alternate attack has a more severe impact than the Previous work in this area focused on improving ac- 
Random attack. Our defense mechanism successfully curacy of the virtual coordinates and the perfomance 
mitigates both types of attacks, with the system stability routing under non-malicious environments [g] and 
the noma1 level and the success fault-tolerant techniques for VCS [6] or for 
degrading gracefully with the number of attackers. the BVR routing protocol [30]. 
E. Coordinate Pollution Attack and Defense 
In these experiments, all the eight beacon nodes also 
act as the coordinate servers. We randomly select three 
of the coordinate servers to be malicious. When the 
defense mechanism is deployed, each node stores its 
coordinates in three random servers based on the hash of 
its ID. A node invokes the majority voting mechanism to 
determine if a coordinate server is malicious if the route 
success ratio using the coordinates from the server falls 
below 0.5. The traffic scenario is that a node is randomly 
The security of geographical routing protocols using 
physical positions was studied in [31] for sensor net- 
works and in [32], [33] for ad hoc networks. Most of the 
work focuses on preventing malicious modifications of 
the destination location information in packets, verifying 
neighbor location information, and preventing message 
droppings. Another main area of work in securing geo- 
graphic routing is the protection of the position service 
in the system, which includes [34], [33]. Securing VCS- 
based routing protocols involves the unique challenges 
of securing the coordinate establishment itself, which 
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is absent in the physical position based geographic [I21 Q. Ren and Q. Liang, "Secure media access control (mac) in 
routings. Thus, a new set of measures are required. wireless sensor networks: intrusion detections and countermea- 
sures," in PIMRC 2004, 2004. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this work we focused on a new class of attacks 
against VCS-based routing protocols for sensor net- 
works. The attacks exploit the reliance of such protocols 
on the accuracy and stability of virtual coordinates. We 
classified these attacks as coordinate inflation, deflation, 
oscillation, and pollution attacks. We proposed several 
defense and mitigation techniques addressing each of 
these attacks. We demonstrated the impact of the attacks 
and the effectiveness of our mitigation techniques using 
a well-known VCS-based routing protocol, BVR, and 
the TOSSIM simulator. Our future work includes further 
analyzing the identified attacks and evaluating their 
impact on other applications of VCS. 
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